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States and Internet Enforcement
Joel R. Reidenberg
THE DEBATE OVER INTERNET JURISDICTION has focused largely on the continued
relevance of territorial borders and on the authority of states to prescribe rules
for online conduct.1 Some academics have argued that the internet creates a
space beyond territorial regulation.2 This view maintains that the internet evades
or escapes national regulation. Other scholars have persuasively argued that
states retain important regulatory authority through prescriptive and personal
jurisdiction.3 These conflicting views appeared dramatically in the case of Yahoo's
auction web site. Yahoo's site allowed the display of Nazi memorabilia around
the world. In France, the display violated democratically chosen rules against
racial, religious and ethnic hatred and a French court ordered Yahoo to block
access to French web users. 4 In the United States, where the servers were
located, Yahoo won an injunction barring the enforcement of the French decision
in the United States.'
Traditionally, a standoff would exist if, as Jack Goldsmith argued: "off-
shore users with no local assets are generally beyond the regulating nation's
enforcement jurisdiction."6 For the online world, however, the situation is much
1. The term "state" in this essay refers to nation-state.
2. David R. Johnson & David Post, "Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace" (1996) 48 Stan. L Rev.
1367; Henry H. Perrit, Jr., "Jurisdiction in Cyberspace" (1996) 41 Viii. L. Rev. 1.
3. Michael Geist, "Cyberlaw 2.0" (2003) 44. B.C.L Rev. 323; Justin Hughes, "The Internet and the Persistence of
Law" (2003) 44 B.C.L Rev. 359; Michael Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, "The Invisible Handshake: The
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment" (2003) 8 Va. J.L & Tech. 6, <http://www.vjolt.net!
vol8/issue2/v8i2_a06-Birnhack-Elkin-Koren.pdf>; Jack Goldsmith, "Unilateral Regulation of the Internet: A
Modest Defence" (2002) 11 E.J.IL. 135, <http://www.ejil.org/journal/Voll 1/ Nol/110135.pdf>, [Goldsmith,
"Unilateral Regulation"]; Michael Geist, "Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet
Jurisdiction" (2001) 16 Berkeley Tech. LJ. 1345, <http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/voll6/
geist!geist.pdf>; Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal
Democratic Theory" (2000) 88 Cal. L Rev. 395; Jack Goldsmith, "Against Cyberanarchy" (1998) 65 U.
Chicago L Rev. 1199, <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Publications/Occasional/ 40.html>; Jack Goldsmith,
"The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty" (1998) 5 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 475.
4. Trib. gr inst. Paris, 20 November 2000, Ordre de r6f6r6, <http://www.forumlnternet.org/telechargement/
documents/tgi-par20001120.pdf>.
5. Yahoo! v. La ligue contre le racisme et 'antis6mitisme, 169 FSupp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
6. Goldsmith, "Unilateral Regulation" supra note 3 at 140.
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more complex. The lack of local assets and the assistance of foreign courts no
longer constrain state enforcement powers. States can enforce their decisions
and policies through internet instruments. Online mechanisms are available and
can be developed for such pursuits.
This essay addresses the enforcement of decisions through internet
instruments. The starting point is a brief justification of internet enforcement as
the obligation of democratic states. Next, the essay argues that the movement
to re-engineer the internet infrastructure by public and private actions also facil-
itates state enforcement of legal and policy decisions. The essay maintains that
states will increasingly try to use network intermediaries such as payment sys-
tems and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) as enforcement instruments. Finally,
and most importantly, the essay focuses on ways that states may harness the
power of technological instruments such as worms, filters and packet intercep-
tors to enforce decisions and sanction malfeasance.
*
1. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR STATE ENFORCEMENT
AGAINST REMOTE PARTIES
DEMOCRACY IS FOUNDED ON THE PRINCIPLE of popular sovereignty. In liberal
democracies, citizens agree to collective governance in order for government to
protect their security and property.7 At the same time, the "social compact"
emphasizes limits on state power.8 For other democracies, the citizenry may make
a more general and absolute delegation of power to the state in order to promote
public liberty.9 In each instance, the government is expected to sustain the rule of
law and thereby guarantee the protection of the rights of citizens. The democratic
state thus has an obligation to assure security, order and the rule of law.
In order to fulfill the state's obligation to its citizens, democracies accord
enforcement authority to the state. Traditionally, this authority includes three
principle powers: the power to redress wrongdoing by members of society
through awards of monetary damages, the power to grant injunctive relief, and
the power to incarcerate. The failure of a democratic state to use these powers
to enforce policies and decisions adopted by the democracy is, in effect, an abdi-
cation of the responsibilities of the state.
For states to meet their responsibilities in the online world, states must
find ways to transpose the powers of enforcement to the internet. For example,
the dueling French and American court decisions in the Yahoo case illustrate
both the profound obligation of states to execute their democratically chosen
policies, and the need for states to transpose enforcement powers online. The
French court ruling that ordered Yahoo to block French users' access to the com-
pany's promotion of Nazi memorabilia was necessary to support French public
7. See e.g. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ed. by Thomas P Peardon (New York: Liberal
Arts Press, 1952) at 70-85.
8. Ibid.
9. See e.g. Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, Le droit sans I'etat: Sur la democratie en France et en Amerique (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1985) at 10.
www.uoltj.ca
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policy.1" Any other decision would have negated the democratically chosen law
in France on hate speech. At the same time, the U.S. court's refusal to recognize
the French decision in the United States rested on the court's belief that the
French ruling was in conflict with the First Amendment and its fundamental poli-
cies for the American democracy.11 While Yahoo had assets in France and ulti-
mately chose to remove Nazi material from its auction site, the conflict shows the
importance of online enforcement.
States confront a challenge for the transposition of legal and physical
powers to the online world, particularly the powers of injunction and incarcera-
tion. "Lex informatica" or "code"-the catchier phrase popularized by Larry
Lessig -provide useful tools for states in this area. 12
2. ENFORCEMENT THROUGH NETWORK ENGINEERING
THE ENGINEERING OF THE INTERNET is itself an important enforcement tool.
Infrastructure design empowers the automatic enforcement of policies and deci-
sions.13 At its origin, the engineering of the internet responded to the first obli-
gation of democratic states: the protection of national security. The U.S.
government initiated the construction of the internet in the context of military
policy. The Department of Defense first funded the creation of the ARPANET to
link civilian and academic research scientists with the military.14 As the project
evolved, "the military wanted to retain the advantages of specialized networks,
but it wanted universal communication among them." i" Ultimately, the internet
design sought to assure the reliable transmission of data, even if links in the
telecommunications routing system failed through error or damage in a war.16
During the 1990s, however, the U.S. government responded to the
internet euphoria and the promise of electronic commerce with the privatization
10. See Joel R. Reidenberg, "Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet" (2002) 42 Jurimetrics 261; Joel R.
Reidenberg, "Laffaire Yahoo! et la d6mocratisation internationale de I'Internet" (2001) Juris Classeur:
Communication Commerce electronique, chron. 12.
11. Supra note 5.
12. See Joel R. Reidenberg, "Governing Networks in Cyberspace" (1996) 45 Emory LJ. 911 at 929-30 (first
using the term lex informatica to describe governance through the interaction of state rules and techno-
logical choices); Joel R. Reidenberg, "Lex Informatica and the Formulation of Information Policy Rules
through Technology" (1998) 76 Texas L. Rev. 553 [Reidenberg, "Lex Informatica"]; Lawrence Lessig, Code
and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999) (using the term "code" to describe rules
established through technological decisions).
13. See e.g. Reidenberg, "Lex Informatica" ibid. at 580-81; Joel R. Reidenberg, "Rules of the Road for Global
Electronic Highways: Merging the Trade and Technical Paradigms" (1993) 6 Harv. J. & Tech. 287,
<http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v06/06HarvJLTech287.pdf> (stating, at 300, that "[tihe technical
choices... set the parameters directly in global network architecture.").
14. See Milton Mueller, Ruling the Root (Boston: MIT Press, 2002) at 74.
15. Ibid. at 75.
16. ACLU v. Reno, 929 FSupp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd 521 U.S. 855 (1997), <http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/
docu ments/opinions/OPI N ION. pdf>, stating, at 831:
From its inception, the network was designed to be a decentralized, self-maintaining series of
redundant links between computers and computer networks, capable of rapidly transmitting com-
munications without direct human involvement or control, and with the automatic ability to re-
route communications if one or more individual links were damaged or otherwise unavailable.
Among other goals, this redundant system of linked computers was designed to allow vital research
and communications to continue even if portions of the network were damaged, say, in a war.
(2003-2004) 1 UOILTJ 213
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and self-regulation of network activities.17 After the burst of the internet bubble
in 2000, the public and private sectors each began to focus on network archi-
tecture to enforce their policies. Public and private efforts both sought to
redesign critical features of online activity. This movement to re-engineer the
internet increasingly facilitates the enforcement of public policy choices and
legal decisions.
2.1. Public Re-engineering
Infrastructure design offers the state an ex ante means to assure that policy deci-
sions are enforced. States can require that rules for the treatment of information
be embedded within the technical system architecture. By "hard-wiring" partic-
ular rules within the infrastructure, states preclude violations and automate the
enforcement of public decisions. Three recent actions illustrate the public sec-
tor's trend toward a re-engineering of the internet. These examples show three
different ways that the state may facilitate automated enforcement.
2.1.1. Engineering Products
The first example shows how regulators may compel developers of technology
to build policy-enforcing designs into their products. In 2002, Microsoft sought
to commercialize an online authentication service, ".NET Passport." The product
was to be "an Internet-scale authentication service providing single sign-in
across multiple participating websites in order to help users to save time and
avoid repetitive data entries when surfing on the Internet."18 More specifically:
The NET Passport architecture uses a single authentication server, which is
operated by Microsoft. The Passport contains some identification and authen-
tication information plus some profiling information.... A user who has logged
on to Passport has a unique identifier, a PUID. If the user wants to log on to
a service provider, he instructs the Passport server to provide the PUID in a
form that is readable by the service provider, currently symmetrically
encrypted. 9
From the start, Microsoft's plans appeared to conflict with European data privacy
law, and faced regulatory scrutiny to assure that the authentication services could
be used in a fashion compatible with European data protection requirements. 20
The consortium of European data protection supervisory authorities,
known as the Article 29 Working Party, pursued an investigation of the compat-
ibility of the .NET Passport with European law. Microsoft worked with the
European supervisory authorities and negotiated an agreement that included
17. See U.S. White House, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (Washington, D.C.: 1997),
<http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy.framewrk.htm>; Kalama Lui-Kwan & Kurt Opsah, "The Legal and
Policy Framework for Global Electronic Commerce: A Progress Report" (1999) 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 503,
<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/voll 4/Foreword/html/reader.html>.
18. EC, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on On-line Authentication Services
(Brussels: Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, January, 2003) at 5, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal-market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp68_en.pdf>.
19. Ibid. at 3-4.
20. See ibid.
www.uoltj.ca
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modifications to the product.21 Among the changes, Microsoft separated the cre-
ation of a NET Password account from the collection of personal information
and agreed to include greater user controls related to the disclosure of personal
information.22 These changes decreased the surveillance aspects of the original
product design. Interestingly, Microsoft announced that these privacy-enhancing
measures would be applied on a worldwide basis, even though only European
law required them. 23
In essence, the Article 29 Working Party obliged Microsoft to build
European data privacy protections directly into the company's technology. This
embedding of privacy rules in the technical design assures enforcement of cer-
tain principles required by the European Directive.24 Like an injunction, re-engi-
neered product design compels compliance with privacy principles.
2.1.2. Engineering Market Access
The second interesting case demonstrates how the state may re-engineer net-
work systems to prevent illegal activities from taking place within the state's juris-
diction. As in many places, gambling is illegal in New York State.2" New York
courts have enjoined internet gambling sites that took bets from New Yorkers.26
Yet, in 2002, the New York State Attorney General pursued a novel approach to
the elimination of online gambling in New York. Attorney General Elliot Spitzer
sought to redesign the online payment network to prevent internet gambling in
New York. Spitzer reached agreements with Paypal27 and Citibank 8 to stop the
processing of payments for internet casinos by blocking transactions according
to merchant codes embedded in the payment system's network. Within a few
months, the majority of credit card issuers in New York signed agreements with
the N.Y Attorney General to block cardholders from using their credit cards to
gamble at internet casinos.29
21. See EC, Press Release, Doc. IP/03/151, "Data Protection: Microsoft Agrees to Change Its NET Passport
System After Discussions With EU Watchdog" (30 January 2003), <http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/
guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt-gt&doc-IP/03/151 01RAPID&Ig-EN>; Microsoft, "Building Trust in Internet
Privacy: The New NET Passport" (undated) <http://download.microsoft.com/download/d/3/d/
d3db3118-dc6d-4a08-967e-485f08a57ae5/Building trustin_lnternet privacy.pdf>, [Microsoft, "Building
Trust"].
22. Microsoft, "Building Trust," ibid.
23. See Helen Jung, "Microsoft Agrees to Changes in Passport" InformationWeek (30 January 2003),
<http://www.informationweek.com/news/IWK2003013050004>.
24. EC, Directive 95/46/ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data
[1995] O.J. L. 281/31, 23/11/1995,
<http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga docsmartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&Ig EN&numdoc-
31995L0046&model-guichett>; Similarly, the Privacy Protection Commissioner of Canada compelled an
airline to reconfigure its web site so that internet users could access the site without having to accept
"cookies." See Privacy Commission of Canada, PIPED Case Summary #162 (Ottawa: April 2003),
<http://www privcom.gc.ca/cf-dc/2003/cf-dc-030416-7-e.asp>.
25. N.Y. Gen. Oblig
. 
§ 5-401, <http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?cl-49&a-12>; N.Y. Penal § 225,
<http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?cl-82&a-55>.
26. See People of the State of New York v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct., 1999).
27. N.Y. Attorney General, Press Release, "Agreement Reached with Paypal to Bar New Yorkers from Online
Gambling" (21 August 2002), <http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug21a 02.html>.
28. N.Y. Attorney General, Press Release, "Financial Giant Joins Fight Against Online Gambling" (14 June
2002), <http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/jun/junl4a 02.html>.
29. N.Y. Attorney General, Press Release, "Ten Banks End Online Gambling with Credit Cards" (11 February
2003), <http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/feb/febl b 03.html>.
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By cutting off the payment mechanisms for recreational gamblers, these
agreements effectively shut down the activities of the major internet casinos in
New York by preventing them from gaining access to the New York market. New
York re-engineered the payment system to achieve ex ante enforcement of the
state ban on gambling. In effect, this type of re-engineering resembles the tra-
ditional power of an injunction. New York was able to preclude offshore internet
sites from taking bets from New Yorkers. Although New York clients of online
casinos might still circumvent this injunctive action, legal systems do not pretend
to achieve perfect compliance. Regulations that can substantially reduce pro-
scribed actions are legitimate and effective.3" Indeed, the overall impact of the
New York agreements will certainly be a successful prevention of online gam-
bling in New York. The payment network thus enforces the New York ban on
gambling by preventing market access to offshore gaming web sites.
2.1.3. Engineering Network Access
The last example demonstrates how states may compel a re-engineering of the
access to network infrastructure in order to enforce behavioural rules. States are
particularly concerned about the control of pornography and obscenity on the
internet. In the United States, the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU 31 struck down
the first attempt to modify access to the internet. The rejected provisions of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996,32 would have resulted in modifications of
access to the internet in order to limit minors' exposure to offensive content. Not
to be deterred, Congress subsequently enacted the Children's Internet
Protection Act (CIPA).33 This statute imposes a ban on the federal funding of
libraries that do not use filters to prevent children from accessing pornography.
This time, Congress was more successful and the Supreme Court upheld the
statute.34 Similarly, Pennsylvania enacted a net blocking law that enables the
state Attorney General to order the blocking of web sites by internet service
providers.3" The constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute is under challenge.36
In each of these instances, the laws sought to create an architecture of
network access that would enforce the state policy for the protection of chil-
dren.37 CIPA's success before the Supreme Court now means that funded
libraries must adopt an infrastructure design that enforces the state policies on
the protection of children against harmful content on the internet.
30. See e.g. Lawrence Lessig, "The Zones of Cyberspace" (1996) 48 Stan. L Rev. 1403 at 1405.
31. 521 U.S. 844 (1997), <http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-511.ZO.html>, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), 223(d) (1996).
33. 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2000), <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/20/9134.html>, [CIPA].
34. See also U.S. v. American Library Assoc., 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003), <http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/
02-361 .ZS.html>, which upholds the constitutionality of the Children's Internet Protection Act.
35. 18 Pa. C.S. § 7626.
36. See Center for Democracy and Technology v. Fisher, E.D. Pa. No. 03-5051 (Sept. 9, 2003).
37. Other countries, too, impose filter obligations on those providing network access. See e.g
. 
France Loi no.
96-659 du 26 juillet 1996, art. 15 which requires service providers to offer content filtering tools to users.
www.uoltj.ca
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2.2. Private Re-engineering
Beyond the public re-engineering efforts, private actors also recognized that
rules could be "hard wired" into the infrastructure to advance commercial inter-
ests. Not surprisingly, the private sector has likewise sought to re-engineer the
internet in ways that facilitate enforcement. A few examples illustrate the trend
for the private sector to search for such enforcement aids.
2.2.1. Engineering Intellectual Property Protection
The difficulty of protecting intellectual property online has led major content
providers to seek infrastructure changes that will advance the enforcement of pro-
prietary rights. The U.S. copyright law gives very broad protection to content
providers and to the technical protection of digital works. While the scope of the
protections provided by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)38 is con-
troversial," digital rights management (DRM) techniques allow intellectual prop-
erty rules to be embedded directly in the infrastructure of online content
distribution. Current DRM technologies seek to foreclose violations of intellectual
property rights by restricting users' interactions with online content.4 This private
use of technology, in effect, empowers ex ante private enforcement of intellectual
property rights.
Similarly, content providers have taken steps to reduce the internet's archi-
tecture of anonymity. The internet communications protocol (TCP/IP) does not
require that parties communicating with each other be personally identified. As
commercial activities emerged on the internet, this anonymity confronted a busi-
ness desire to identify users. At first, "phone home" technologies enabled content
providers to track product usage.41 Manufacturers such as Sony announced that all
new products would contain a unique IP address,42 thereby facilitating surveillance
programs. More recently, content providers targeted anonymous file sharing. Since
transaction records leave digital traces embedded in communication routing, the
infrastructure may be "reverse engineered" to identify or profile users. Now, con-
tent providers seek to use these infrastructure capabilities and resources to iden-
tify file sharers who illegally swap copyrighted works.
Whether or not one agrees with the scope of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, the law may entitle content providers to compel the identification
of internet users.43 For example, the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) successfully sued Verizon, an internet service provider, in federal district
38. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998), <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ 17/
1201 .html> [DMCA].
39. See e.g. Julie E. Cohen, "DRM and Privacy" (2003) 18 Berkeley Tech. LJ. 575,
<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol 8/Cohen.stripped.pdf>; Dan L Burk & Julie E.
Cohen, "Fair Use Infrastructure for Copyright Management Systems" (2001) 15 Harv. J.L & Tech. 41,
<http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/ 5HarvJLTechO4l .pdf>.
40. See e.g. Microsoft, MSDN, Windows Media 9 Series,
<http://msdn microsoft.com/ibrary/default asp?url /ibrary/en-us/wmrm/htm/quickstart asp>.
41. See e.g. Adam Cohen, "Spies Among Us" Time Europe (31 July 2000),
<http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/2000/0731/cover.html> (stating that "[more than 20 million
people have downloaded programs that secretly snoop inside their PCs.").
42. "Sony to Assign IP Addresses to All Products" NE Asia Online (27 April 2001), <http://www.nikkeibp.
asiabiztech.com/wcs/frm/leaf?CID-onair/asabt/news/129248>.
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h).
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court for the identities of subscribers.44 By forcing Verizon to match log files with
client records, the RIAA sought to unmask illegal traders of copyrighted works. 45
While this particular decision was reversed on appeal, the court did make clear
that hosting services would have obligations to divulge the identities of alleged
copyright infringers. Verizon did not have to reverse engineer the identities
because the appellate court found that the service provider's specific activities-
those of a transmission conduit, rather than a hosting service-were outside the
statutory clause. 46 As a result, more cases will certainly explore the scope of this
clause in the DMCA. These efforts, though, demonstrate a movement toward the
re-engineering of the infrastructure in ways that prevent anonymous file sharing
and that enforce intellectual property rights.
2.2.2. Engineering Commercial Protection
Private organizations have similarly pursued the re-engineering of network infor-
mation flows to enforce commercial policies. Perhaps the most visible example
comes from VeriSign. This company has a monopoly on the management of the
".com" domain name registry for the internet. In September 2003, VeriSign initi-
ated a program called "Site Finder" that redirected mistyped domain names to
an advertiser-supported web site at VeriSign.4 1 VeriSign sought to exploit its
monopoly position and generate advertising revenue from these redirects built
directly into the internet routing infrastructure. The move was particularly con-
troversial and faced substantial opposition from the internet community.
Other companies also redirect internet traffic to respond to powerful com-
mercial interests. For example, Google redirects any request by a French user to
<http://www.google.com>, a US-based server, to <http://www.google.fr>, a
French server.48 The burgeoning spam problem on the internet has likewise
prompted companies to install spam blocks and filters. These technical devices seek
to prevent communications that might otherwise harm service providers' email
servers or their clients. Thus, for commercial reasons, companies are looking to
infrastructure designs as a means to execute and enforce their commercial policies.
*
3. ENFORCEMENT THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES
EVEN WITH A RE-ENGINEERING OF THE INTERNET in ways that empower state
enforcement capabilities, the proliferation and dispersion of internet participants
may still make direct enforcement against rule breakers difficult and expensive.
44. Recording Industry Assoc. of America v. Verizon Internet Services, 240 FSupp.2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003),
<http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/02-ms-323.pdf>.
45. Christopher Stern "Verizon Identifies Download Suspects" Washington Post (6 June 2003) E05,
<http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/articles/A21198-2003Jun5. html>.
46. Recording Industry Assoc. of America v. Verizon Internet Services, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25735 (D.C. Cir
Dec. 19, 2003), <http://pacer. cadc. uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200312/03 -7015a. pdf>.
47. See Declan McCullagh, "VeriSign Stands Firm On Domain Redirect" CNET News.corn (22 September
2003), <http://news.com.com/2100-1032-5080384.html?tag nl>.
48. Apparently, Google filters URL requests originating from French ISPs and redirects them to Google's French
site. For example, all of the author's requests to <http://www.google.com> from the Free.fr dial up internet
service and from the Noos.fr cable internet service are each redirected automatically to
<http://www.google.fr>.
www.uoltj.ca
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States cannot ignore, and are likely to pursue, additional means of enforcement
through intermediaries or proxies. Various points in the network infrastructure
serve as gateways that in effect re-centralize access to the internet. These gate-
ways might be access providers, hosting services, or major switching hubs that
are located within the jurisdiction of the interested state. The existence of these
gateway points in an otherwise decentralized network entices states to focus
efforts and find enforcement mechanisms that operate through the intermedi-
aries at these points.
3.1. Progressive Responsibility
During the initial internet euphoria, policy-makers gave network intermediaries
important immunities for data transiting their systems. In the United States, the
Telecommunications Act of 199641 exculpated ISPs from liability for the content
of transmitted data."° Initially, Congress adopted this policy to provide an incen-
tive for the development of internet communications. The subsequent major U.S.
intellectual property legislation, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 19981
(DMCA), also generally exonerated web hosting services from liability for copy-
right infringements of hosted content.52 But the DMCA did not create an
absolute immunity. Under the DMCA, liability for copyright infringement could
attach if the hosting service failed to remove allegedly infringing material once
the copyright owner provided the service with a notice of the infringement.5 3
This difference in the treatment of intermediaries reflects in part the economic
importance of intellectual property rights, and the relative value that the state
places on protecting those rights.
As other state values become more significant, corresponding reductions
in the scope of immunity for online intermediaries are enacted. For example, the
value of security rose to critical importance after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. The legislation that quickly followed, the USA PATRIOT
Act,5 4 facilitated government access to customer data held by service providers.
The new provisions entitle the government to obtain data from service providers
for law enforcement purposes under more relaxed legal standards than under the
prior law. At the same time, the new provisions grant service providers immunity
from damages if they volunteer information to the government about their clients'
activities."5 While couched as an immunity from damages, this provision trans-
forms the intermediary into a law enforcement agent and breaks down pre-exist-
ing barriers between service providers and law enforcement. Service providers
49. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
50. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2002). See Jonathan Zittrain, "Internet Points of Control" (2003) 44 B.C.L Rev. 653,
<http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/meta-elements/journals/bclawr/44 2/10 FMS.htm> noting the
shift toward control through intermediaries on the internet.
51. Supra note 38.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2002).
53. Ibid. See also Alfred C. Yen, "Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement,
Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment" (2000) 88 Geo. LJ. 1833 who discusses the "jousting" in
the United States over the imposition of liability on ISPs for copyright infringement by subscribers.
54. Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
55. Ibid. at §§ 210-212.
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now a have greater incentive and responsibility to assist the state in its law
enforcement mission. In other words, the state has begun building a statutory
regime that imposes greater responsibility on intermediaries.
3.2. Attractive Agents
Just as legal responsibility is likely to turn progressively toward intermediaries,
intermediaries become ever more attractive as agents for rule enforcement. The
temptation to use intermediaries arises from the confluence of two factors. To
the extent that actual wrongdoers are numerous and dispersed, the state will
require substantial resources to pursue each wrongdoer and such pursuits are
likely to encounter practical obstacles. By contrast, to the extent that the activi-
ties of dispersed wrongdoers are channeled through gateway points, these inter-
mediaries are easier to reach and offer more efficient results. The centralization
of activity through gateways provides state authorities with new enforcement
opportunities.56
The example of illegal transactions illustrates a growing attractiveness
for states to pursue law enforcement through intermediaries. In New York, the
direct legal fight against online casinos was difficult and did not give the state's
Attorney General satisfactory results. New York's first attempt to block an illegal
gambling website earned an important injunction against an off-shore casino
site. 7 But the proliferation and decentralized nature of such sites defied the effi-
cacy of sequential direct enforcement actions. In effect, New York was stymied in
its efforts to reach the illegal gambling sites themselves. Similarly, individual
actions against illegal gamblers, the users of such sites, could not easily be
undertaken due to the expense and difficulty of identifying the wrongdoers. The
New York Attorney General then targeted the payment system. 8 Payment inter-
mediaries were easy to identify and attractive instruments for enforcement
because they would both prevent sites from operating in New York and prevent
New Yorkers from engaging in illegal gambling. New York found that enforce-
ment against payment intermediaries within its jurisdiction was more efficient
and effective. Likewise, New York City asked eBay to remove World Trade Center
items hosted on the company's auction website.5 9 The city claimed that the sale
of particular items violated police and fire department trademarks. Yet, rather
than directly challenging the sellers, New York enlisted the intermediary, eBay, to
police the behaviour of auction sellers.
Intermediaries also become attractive targets for states to use in the pur-
suit of the enforcement of public order. For example, India recently ordered ISPs to
block access to a Yahoo newsgroup that offended Indian public policy.6° Similarly,
56. But, "DarkNets" may still try to mask nefarious actions. See Heather Green, "The Underground Internet"
Business Week Online (15 September 2003), <http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03 37/
b3849089 mz063.htm>.
57. People of the State of New York v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S. 2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1999),
<http://www.oag.state.ny.us/Internet/litigation/wigc.html>.
58. See Part 2.1.2. above.
59. Michael Cooper "eBay is Asked to Remove Trade Center Items" The New York Times (22 February 2002)
A13.
60. "India Blocks Almost All Yahoo! Forums" ABCNews.com (29 September 2003), <http://abcnews.go.com/
wire/Business/ap20030929 1278.html>.
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the European Directive on Electronic Commerce61 expressly allows member state
authorities to order the blocking of conduit transmissions that violate local law, and
allows member state authorities to impose liability for knowingly hosting third party
content that violates local law. 62 In the United States, the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 63 also enlists telecommunications service
providers to develop infrastructures that assist law enforcement wiretaps. 64
As the capabilities of intermediaries to identify and interdict malevolent
actors increase, states will focus on options to use these intermediaries. States,
for example, will find routing backbone gateways attractive enforcement agents.
The scandal created by VeriSign's re-routing of internet traffic for commercial
gain illustrates the ease with which key intermediaries may be able to isolate
internet participants.6 VeriSign controlled the main directory for internet
addresses. When VeriSign sought to direct users who mistyped internet
addresses to Site Finder, VeriSign's own advertiser-supported search page, the
internet community was outraged and the company suspended the commercial
venture.66 Yet, if this capability can be used for commercial purposes, states will
insist on using such capabilities for legitimate law enforcement.
*
4. ENFORCEMENT THROUGH TECHNOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS
THE ENFORCEMENT OF POLICIES AND RULES through the re-engineering of the
internet and through online intermediaries show that technological instruments
may also offer extremely powerful tools for states to sanction internet actors.
States may harness the power of "lex informatica" and use technologies to imple-
ment law enforcement actions. Beyond infrastructure re-engineering for ex ante
enforcement such as the .NET Passport changes, 67 techniques that create disrup-
tive technologies have police powers that are also available for states to use in
connection with law enforcement. These technologies offer several types of
enforcement mechanisms. A state must, however, consider a variety of important
factors in choosing among the different technological enforcement mechanisms.
4.1. The Police Power of Technologies
Widely proliferating viruses and worms illustrate the ease of exploiting technol-
ogy to disrupt online interactions.68 For example, Code Red destroyed the web
61. See EC, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 8 June 2000, on certain
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce in the Internal Market,
[2000] O.J. L 178/1, <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/1-178/1-17820000717en00010016.pdf>.
62. Ibid. at arts. 12(3),14(3).
63. Pub. L No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994).
64. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2002).
65. See Part 2.2.2. above. See also Elizabeth Olson "Disputes Erupt Over Service for Poor Internet Typists"
The New York Times (18 September 2003) C3.
66. Elizabeth Olson "VeriSign Agrees to Suspend Disputed Site Finder Service" The New York Times (4 October
2003) C14.
67. See Part 2.1.1 above.
68. See Steve Hamm, "Epidemic: Crippling Computer Viruses and Spam Attacks Threaten the Information
Economy. Can They Be Stopped?" Business Week (8 September 2003) 28, <http://businessweek.com/
magazine/content/03_36/b3848001_mz001 .htm>.
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pages of infected servers. 69 SoBig.F sought to direct traffic to particular web sites
at specified times.7" LoveBug flooded the internet with email messages. 71 Blaster
exploited a known flaw in the Microsoft operating system security and caused
widespread service degradation for users across the internet.72
These disruptive technologies have important police powers. Digital
protestors and vigilantes have proven that disruptive technologies can be used
as specific weapons against particular online organizations. Enemies of several
online companies have successfully damaged the ability of companies to do busi-
ness on the internet. Denial of service attacks against Amazon, Yahoo, eBay and
CNN seriously interrupted the operations of these major internet companies and
temporarily shut down the corporate web sites.73 The more recent Blaster worm
targeted Microsoft for criticism. Infected computers bore the legend "Billy gates
why do you make this possible? Stop making money and fix your software." 74
The worm used a denial of service attack to overwhelm the web page for
Windows updates and forced Microsoft to take the web page offline.71 Similarly,
advocates of spam have launched "zombie armies" to disable operators of
spain-blocking lists.76 Even digital warriors in furtherance of geo-political advan-
tage are now using these technologies. 77 Last year, when AI-Jazeera launched an
English language web site to disseminate propaganda at the time of the second
Gulf War, the web site was forced offline by a denial of service attack. 78
Other forms of disruptive technologies further demonstrate that tech-
nological instruments can police data processing practices. For example, super-
market shoppers who were concerned about privacy turned to digital techniques
to prevent a supermarket chain from gathering accurate profile information. The
shoppers used cloned supermarket discount cards to frustrate the collection of
personal information for customer profiling. 79 In effect, private parties have
shown that disruptive technological instruments are effective to enforce privately
chosen rules and policies."0
69. CERT Advisory, CA-2001-19 "'Code Red' Worm Exploiting Buffer Overflow In IIS Indexing Service DLL" (19
July 2001), <http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-19.html>.
70. CERT Incident Note, IN-2003-03 (22 August 2003), <http://www.cert.org/incident notes/IN-2003-03.html>.
71. CERT Advisory, CA-2000-04 "Love Letter Worm" (4 May 2000), <http://www.cert.org/advisories/
CA-2000-04.html>.
72. CERT Advisory, CA-2003-20 "W32/Blaster Worm" (11 August 2003), <http://www.cert.org/advisories/
CA-2003-20.html>.
73. Ann Harrison, "Cyberassaults hit Buy.com, Amazon, and CNN" ComputerWorld (9 February 2000),
<http://www.computerworld.com/news/2000/story/O,11280,43010,00.html>.
74. John Oltsik, "Behind Microsoft's Latest PR Blitz" Wired 11:9 (24 September 2003),
<http://news.com.com/2010-1002-5081234.html>.
75. Supra note 72: "Lab testing has confirmed that the worm includes the ability to launch a TCP SYN flood
denial-of-service attack against windowsupdate.com."
76. Mike Brunker, "Spam Block Lists Bombed to Oblivion" MSNBC.com (24 September 2003),
<http://www.msnbc.com/news/95094.asp?Ocv TB10&cpl- >.
77. Michael Vatis, "Cyberattacks during the War on Terrorism: A Predictive Analysis" Working Paper of The
Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth College (22 September 2001) at 5-9,
<http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/ISTS/counterterrorism/cyber al .pdf>.
78. See "Al-Jazeera Web Site Under Hacking Attack, Host Says" Associated Press (25 March 2003),
<http://www. chron. com/cs/CDA/ssistory. mpl /special /iraq/ 1835732>.
79. David Gallagher "The Man Who Would Buy Everything, Everywhere" The New York Times (10 March 2003)
C3.
80. One should note that many such private actions are likely to violate existing computer crime laws. An
analysis of these issues is beyond this essay. Here the point is to show the power of technologies for
police-like purposes.
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4.2. Types of Technological Enforcement
Just as disruptive technologies embody police powers when used by private
actors, these technologies can also be used by states to support law enforce-
ment. Three key types of technological mechanisms are available for enforce-
ment: (1) the creation of electronic borders around a state to secure compliance
with laws and policies; (2) the imposition of electronic blockades to enjoin viola-
tions; and (3) the imposition of electronic sanctions to punish violators. Each of
these instruments has important and varying consequences for states and third
parties. Electronic borders have fewer extraterritorial implications than electronic
blockades and electronic blockades are less hostile than electronic sanctions.
4.2.1. Electronic Borders
States may block outsiders from entering the state online through packet inter-
ception or filtering. Although currently available techniques may be rudimentary
for these purposes, states may certainly develop more robust technologies to
create electronic borders. A number of countries such as China and Saudi Arabia
have already established the equivalent of online national borders by requiring
service providers to filter internet traffic.81 These electronic borders replicate
general national boundaries on the internet. Yet, the erection of technical fences
is not limited to autocratic states and general borders. Democracies such as
France and India have imposed electronic borders against specific rule violators.
France ordered Yahoo to block transmissions into France of illegal Nazi dis-
plays.8 2 Similarly, India ordered internet service providers to block entry into India
of Yahoo discussion groups.83
By creating an electronic border, a state prevents communications with
rule offenders and isolates those offenders outside the state. Such a border is
like a self-enforcing injunction against violations of the state's rules. The elec-
tronic border does not directly effect redress, but may force the foreign party to
remedy any harm as a condition of online re-entry into the state. Importantly, the
creation of an electronic border requires a police action either through packet
interception or filtering. While packet interception techniques may be initiated
directly by law enforcement, filtering would require the use of intermediaries-
internet service providers or backbone routing hubs-as agents.
4.2.2. Electronic Blockades
As a corollary to an electronic internet border, states may initiate a police action
to stop a law offender's transmissions from going outside the offender's country.
Packet interception techniques can be used or developed to capture the
offender's transmissions when the destination is external to the offender's coun-
81. See Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, "Documentation of Internet Filtering Worldwide" Berkman
Center for Internet and Society (24 October 2003), <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/>; Shanthi
Kalathil & Taylor C. Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian
Rule (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), [Kalathil & Boas, Open
Networks].
82. Supra note 4.
83. See Dinesh C. Sharma, "India Bans a Yahoo Group" C/Net (23 September 2003), <http://news.com.com/
2100-10283-5081021 .html>.
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try. This type of blockade enjoins an offender from participating on the internet
outside the offender's home country and is the equivalent of incarceration or
home confinement. In effect, the enforcing state creates an electronic prison that
is co-extensive with the host country.
Since the electronic police action is targeted against a particular actor's
activities outside the host country, an electronic blockade does not directly
offend the territorial integrity of the host country. Nevertheless, a blockade is a
hostile act. An electronic blockade imposes restraints on organizations and indi-
viduals within host countries. Correspondingly, the blockading state necessarily
enlists intermediaries to assist in the creation of the electronic fence. Packet
interception or other similar technologies will operate through the internet's
transmission intermediaries. In addition, an electronic blockade negatively
affects other countries when the offender's access is blocked to the third coun-
try destinations.8 4 Nevertheless, an electronic blockade appears as the online
equivalent to incarceration and may also be used to force a foreign party to com-
ply with state laws and policies.
4.2.3. Electronic Sanctions
Finally, states may electronically sanction rule offenders by using technologies to
penalize or destroy the offenders' online presence.8" To sanction offenders, a
state might launch a denial of service (DOS) or a distributed denial of service (dis-
tributed DOS) attack. This is an "online death penalty" and prevents an offender
from interacting on the internet. A state may also use hacking techniques to
.seize" or paralyze rule-violating web pages just as the state might execute a
seizure order for real or personal property. In other words, the state may use
techniques similar to the MS Blaster worm for law enforcement purposes.86 Yet,
electronic sanctions may cause collateral damage to third parties. For example,
while a state may launch a DOS attack from state servers, a distributed DOS
attack enlists the use of private computing power and both attacks cripple the
offender's host server. Others who rely on the same server will face service inter-
ruption and be penalized without cause in the host country.
Electronic sanctions are the most aggressive and hostile type of techno-
logical enforcement. They are a police action that takes place on the foreign ter-
ritory where the offender is located. For the offender's host country, an electronic
attack is a hostile act because it violates the country's territorial integrity. Indeed,
under the computer crime laws of many countries, the electronic attack against
an offender might be illegal.8 7 Sovereign immunity would nevertheless apply
since the attacks are launched by a foreign state. But, in design, this type of
84. These restrictions on international communications are not likely to violate a state's obligations under the
World Trade Organization rules because they are imposed for law enforcement purposes.
85. Recent US proposals have also sought statutory authorization for private parties to engage in self-help
measures that bear a resemblance to electronic sanctions. A discussion of the merits and objections to such
a privatization of law enforcement is outside the scope of this essay and will have to wait for another day.
86. See e.g. Matt Richtel, "Spread of Attacks on Web Sites is Slowing Traffic on the Internet" NY Times (10
February 2000) Al.
87. For an interesting discussion of the scope of US cybercrime statutes, see Orin Kerr, "Cybercrime's Scope:
Interpreting 'Access' and 'Authorization' in Computer Misuse Statutes" (2003) 78 N.Y.U.L Rev. 1596,
<http://www.nyu.edu/pages/lawreview/78/5/kerr.pdf>.
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police action is a form of information warfare. The use of these capabilities, thus,
has serious implications for the launching state. Already, the Bush administration
reportedly has prepared guidelines for cyber-attacks designed to disrupt enemy
computer networks.88 According to Richard Clarke, former adviser to the
President on cybersecurity, the technological capabilities presently exist. 9 For
serious rule violations that fundamentally threaten public order, states may
decide that electronic sanctions are a necessary and justified last resort.
4.3. The Deployment of Technological Enforcement Mechanisms
For democratic societies, the use of any technological enforcement instrument
necessitates carefully prescribed authorization criteria. Like other police powers
of the state, legal authority is a pre-requisite for the exercise of coercive powers.
Each mechanism implicates important civil, political and sovereign rights. As a
threshold matter, states must have a legal process in place to authorize the use
and choice of technological enforcement tools.
For the choice to use a technological instrument or to deploy a specific
type of instrument, the basic principle guiding these decisions should be that a
state only use the least intrusive means to accomplish the rule enforcement. Four
factors must be considered to determine whether and how to use technologies
for rule enforcement. First, a state must weigh the magnitude of any threat to
public order. If a threat is significant, a state may be justified in taking more dras-
tic measures, such as an electronic blockade. Second, the urgency of any threat
is significant. If continuing rule violations pose imminent danger to a state's pub-
lic order, a state will have a stronger justification to use more serious measures,
such as electronic sanctions. Third, a state must evaluate the effectiveness of the
tool. If a tool will not be effective against the rule violation, then the collateral
implications may outweigh any justificatory use. Last, a state must consider the
ultimate enforcement goal. If the state seeks the cessation of offending activity,
the technological enforcement tool may be different than the choice to compel
a violator to pay monetary damages.
5. CONCLUSIONS
AS THE INTERNET MATURES, network engineering, intermediaries and technolo-
gies all provide states with greater means to enforce legal decisions and policies.
In fulfilling their responsibilities toward their citizens, states must harness "lex
informatica" as an instrument for the enforcement of decisions and policies for
online activity.
The evolution toward more frequent online enforcement seems
inevitable and a number of observations and predictions can be made. Public
objectives and commercial pressures will result in re-engineered networks that
are designed in ways supporting online enforcement, including greater geo-
88. Bradley Graham "Bush Orders Guidelines for Cyber-Warfare" The Washington Post (7 February 2003) Al.
89. Ibid.: "We have capabilities, we have organizations; we do not yet have an elaborated strategy, doctrine,
procedures...".
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graphic identification and diminishing anonymity. Gateways will increasingly find
themselves in the middle of enforcement actions despite the initially strong
immunities granted to internet intermediaries; intermediaries offer the most effi-
cient and attractive means to reach rule violators. The critical importance of tech-
nological tools means that new instruments will be developed for the purpose of
law enforcement, such as sophisticated means to intercept offender's data traf-
fic. Finally, the choices among technological enforcement instruments will ulti-
mately rely on political calculations because the choices impose different levels
of hostility against other countries, ranging from an electronic border as the least
offensive to electronic sanctions as the most offensive choices.
We can expect to see three phases in internet enforcement by states.
The first use of new online enforcement instruments will cause international con-
troversy, just like the Chinese decisions to control the web at the border90 and
the French decision that required Yahoo to block access to French users.9 1 But
the second use takes on a more routine character, like the Indian decision to
order the blocking of Yahoo newsgroups. 92 At the third phase, online enforce-
ment with electronic blockades and electronic sanctions will cause serious inter-
national political conflicts. These conflicts arise because of the impact on
territorial integrity. Such conflicts are likely to force negotiations toward interna-
tional agreements that establish the legal criteria for a state to use technological
enforcement mechanisms. This progression leads appropriately to political deci-
sions that will define international legal rules.
90. Kalathil & Boas, Open Networks, supra note 81 at 13-42. Chapter 2 is available at <http://www.first
monday.dk/issues/issue8l/kalathil/kalathil-chapter2.html>.
91. Supra note 4.
92. Supra note 83.
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